How a nuclear referendum could succeed on President Trump’s executive order against South Africa

Photography Source: Pipodesign Philipp P egli – CC for 3.0

South African policy has been agitation during the last fifteen days after President Trump issued a Executive Order against Our government for its alleged abuse of citizens of Afrikaner descent and the damage that has allegedly caused US foreign policy interests by bringing Ally Israel to the International Court of Justice for charges of genocide. This punitive action and the possibility that they can continue has made many analysts and experts fight with proposals that will presumably provide the country with a measure of protection against Trump’s anger.

The most obvious way that the government could do so is to change the tactic of the problems that, according to the reports, have raised their anger. For several reasons, it is unlikely that the South African government can do so without risking serious damage to its foreign policy credibility and entertaining socio -political instability nationwide. In terms of its foreign policy, given its anti-colonial and pro-palestinian position and the impulse to achieve a fair and lasting solution to the conflict of Israel-Palestine that the demand it launched and other countries have joined, has created, reverse its position will damage your height internationally. Similarly, the revocation of the expropriation of long data without the compensation law under pressure of an external power, even before it proves it in our courts, threatens socio -political stability, since it could be popularly perceived as the government that despises An important tool to repair racial inequality that endures in a deeply unequal society. , despite the opinion shared among the main legal academics that the real power of this act gives the South African government to USURP property rights of individuals are much more limited That what critics of this legislation would have to the public, or at least pres. Trump, believes. In addition, considering Trump’s vindictive nature and the way in which their administration has treated the firm European allies as Denmark who have generally accepted the previous US demands, South African political leaders are probably skeptical about whether the changing policy direction would apply to pres. Trump, even more when surrounded by an influential clique billionaires with deep links with apartheid South Africa.

Alternatively, the South African government could try to appease pres. Trump playing in the instincts of its businessman and looking for an agreement in which the country could make transactions with the United States (USA.) A base so unequal that could effectively serve as coverage to pay the United States. He could do so, for example, when entering a commercial agreement in an area of ​​strategic interest for the US. In terms that are very favorable for the United States. Speculatively, given the commercial nuclear interests They have postulated as driving. Trump’s South Africa orientation, a main area where it could do it, is the South Africa Nuclear Energy Sector.

However, entering a nuclear agreement with the USA the zero -sum of the economic trade model to which the US. Energy that is required to advance and develop the rapid growth of artificial intelligence industry and are compensated for any responsibility for their actions to which the great technological entrepreneurs that constitute pres. Trump’s internal circle aspires. Under such conditions, the fears that, according to these commercial magnates, who have the ear of a belligerent foreign leader, the main role in the nuclear energy sector and the country’s data technology infrastructure, would be similar to placing to place The country’s economic development trajectory in the hands of a hostile entity and relegating the country to the state of a colony of technological resources.

In addition, it is likely that the folding towards the pressure of the United States will decrease the position of the government both nationally and within BRICS. As a result, it is not unrealistic to wait for it to sharpen divisions within an already fractured African National CongressEven so, the most important political party in South Africa, although its support is falling precipitously, and possibly leads to the collapse of the National Unity Government (GNU) depending on the political parties of the faction within the ANC that wins this battle internally chooses to govern.

A agreement with the allies of BRICS Russia, which for a long time has been favored to ensure any nuclear agreement, or new Iran member, as reported in many stores in many premises publicationsTo protect yourself from pres. It is unlikely that Trump’s anger offers a lot of sure given the danger of more sanctions from the US. If it does and the minimum commercial and economic ties between SA and these countries. This leaves BRICS’s ally and Chinese main trading partner. Although he is a viable candidate, fears of a Chinese debt trap, stopping suspicions of Chinese interests due to the past espionage acts that China has been accused of committing to our nuclear facilities and the fact that China has full hands undertaking a Massive nuclear centrals at the national levelThey are likely to be reluctant to South African political leaders to associate with China in the nuclear industry.

The previous analyzes are incomplete and is suitable to underestimate the magnitude of the effect that ensures an agreement with a BRICS country, or the United States, could have in our domestic policy, since it ignores the existence of national groups that have their own agendas nuclear, e.g Afriforum, the Lobby Afrikaner group that, according to the reports, convinced pres. Trump of the need to act in the name of the Afrikaner minor It is already showing signs of tension. It also minimizes the difficulties that the government will find if you try to promote a decision to expand nuclear energy capacity due to popular opposition this The controversial decision causes locally.

Although the aforementioned scenarios could be incomplete, they provide enough bases on which to conclude that the government could face an even greater situation if you try to take advantage of a nuclear agreement to get out of the current dilemma. Derived from this conclusion, it would seem to be reasonable if the government chose to give up complete nuclear energy. Although, to the letter, a sensitive course of action, it is unlikely that a feasible option is considered by the well -known politicians aware of the omnipresence of the chauvinism of natural resources that animates the internal political discourse and strength of the nuclear lobby ; widely defined. For pres. Ramaphosa in particular, runs the risk of losing the political face and confirming the unpleasant evaluations of its character as weak and undecided If you choose to do nothing when it comes to pursuing the expansion of nuclear energy. If so, one could reasonably assume that it would only be a matter of time before being withdrawn from office.

Fortunately, there is a political way for the government to counteract from Trump’s threat without widening in any of these scenarios. He could do so by subjecting his nuclear plans to a popular referendum. Asking for a referendum about nuclear energy provides the South African government for a series of political benefits. In the first place, he would send a strong signal to national critics and their foreign supporters who will not be intimidated and intend to carry out their nuclear treatment in an open and transparent manner guided so that all citizens believe that it is the best for your interest; Not those of foreign oligarchs, narrow or powerful domestic interest groups.

More crucial than the political signal that sends is the time when I would buy South African diplomats to explore diplomatic paths to repair the gap between SA and the United States and the time it would grant South African politicians to identify and take the necessary measures to use useless actions adverse by an e. Uu. Erratic. To maximize the time that a referendum could buy, the government could establish the date of a referendum during the last part of the Trump term. A secondary benefit to keep it later in its mandate instead of before is that the GNU would also approach at the end of its term by then. As such, any negative political consequences caused by the result of the referendum in case the GNU collapsara would be minimized. In the economic front, postponing a nuclear decision and avoid the consequences associated with it that would provide time to South Africans to explore ways to reduce their dependence on the US. UU. Trying to find new markets for their products or budgeting more cuts in the help from the United States. Time would also allow maneuvering politicians to explore alternative public works projects that are not exclusive, since they allow the country to associate with Western allies and BRIC less not as much as the controversial decision to expand nuclear energy capacity is likely. To this end, this author has previously floated the idea of ​​incorporating a New District of the National Capital In the state province of free orange located in the center, citing the possible economic and construction benefits of the nation that such construction project could provide.

Taking into account the possible benefits described above, it is argued that a referendum on nuclear energy offers South African not only the means to resist current diplomatic storm, but an opportunity to elaborate a vision for the country that is diametrically opposed to implicit supremacism In the threat pres. Trump issued the South African government in his executive order that demands that Cueva at the pressure of the United States or otherwise.